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Table of Contents

Introduction	7
Why the roundtable?	18
Participants	21
Recommendations	23
Situation in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)	25
Re-emergence of strategic threat	29
State and ideology in Pakistan	33
Redefining priorities	37
Adding human narrative	39
Reliability of statistics	43
Involvement of civilian authorities	45

Annexure 1: Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan	46
Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan:	
2003-2011 (Yearly)	46
Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan:	
2003-2011 (Month-Wise)	47
Annexure 2: Profiles of Arrested Terrorists	48
Sectarian Distribution of Arrested Terrorists	48
Ethnic Distribution	48
Educational Attainment of Arrested Terrorist	48
Group Basis Distribution	48
Spatial Distribution—Top 20 Districts (1990-2009)	49
Geographic Spread of the Arrested Terrorists	49

Introduction

Pakistan is now into the tenth year of the war on terror, which started in 2001. Since 2003, there have been at least 32,655 fatalities reported due to terrorism or terrorist related incidents. A total of 9,410 civilians have lost their lives during the war on terror, while 3,326 security personnel have laid down their lives in the line of duty. Terrorists and insurgents have suffered an estimated casualty of 19,919.¹ The role of Pakistan in this conflict was initiated after the 9/11 attacks. Pakistan was identified as the most important coalition member, due to its strategic location regarding Afghanistan and the presence of terror outfits on its soil. The country's leadership out rightly condemned this act of terror and embarked on a long and difficult struggle to eradicate terrorism. The war on terror and terrorism has not inflicted its wrath on just a specific country or region, but has changed the entire geo-political environment. In addition to this the economic recession, which started in the United States, quickly engulfed the whole world.

During 2010, a total of 7,435 people lost their lives because of terrorism. They included 1,796 civilians, 469 security personnel, and 5,170 terrorists. As compared to that 11,704 people perished in 2009, where 2,324 were civilians, 991 were security personnel and 8,389 were terrorists.² A comparative review of these figures indicates that there has been marked decrease in loss of civilian and security personnel lives over the last two years.

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¹ http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm.

² http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm.

	Terrorist Attacks in	n Fata (2009)	
Agency	No. of Attacks	Killed	Injured
South Waziristan	89	75	152
North Waziristan	66	139	187
Kurram	36	28	39
Orakzia	28	28	7
Khyber	109	183	420
Bajawar	123	66	107
Mohmand	108	125	134
Total	559	664	1046

Source: Pak Institute for Peace Studies. "Pakistan Security Report 2009". Islamabad

After the partition of India, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) was included in Pakistan. Muhammad Ali Jinnah agreed to maintain its existing system of autonomy under Maliks, the local tribal elders. However the region underwent a radical change in the 1980s with the entry of the Mujahideen and CIA's Operation Cyclone against the Soviet Union. In 2001 after 9/11 kamikaze attacks, Taliban and Al-Qaeda militants began sneaking into the region. With local people sympathetic towards Taliban, the militants set their bases in the region along the Pak-Afghan border.

Comparative social sector indicators						
Indicator	Pakistan	KP	FATA			
Literacy rate (both sexes, %)	43.92	35.41	17.42			
Male literacy rate (%)	54.81	51.39	29.51			
Female literacy rate (%)	32.02	18.82	3.00			
Population per doctor	1,226	4,916	7,670			
Population per in health institutions	1,341	1,594	2,179			
Road (per sq km)	0.26	0.13	0.17			

Source: Aziz, Khalid. "Agenda for FATA Reforms"

Pakistan is fighting a war, which the extremists have converted into a conflict of ideologies. More than 60 percent of Pakistan's population is under 25, giving a supply of recruits to these terrorists. Our young generation is being affected by whatever is happening in this society. These Jihadi organizations and their sympathizers exploit the misery of other Muslims, as the basis for their propaganda. They preach inaccurate interpretations of Islamic values. Having little or no knowledge of religion, the people have been victimized. The war is not only being fought in the terrains of North-West Pakistan, but also in the hearts and minds of the whole nation. The extremist elements have penetrated every quarter of our society, to further their radical agenda. Pakistan is winning the war in the field, but there are more efforts required to curb the extremist agenda from spreading.

Due to the instability engulfing the country, Pakistan has also been a victim of the economic recession that has hit the whole world. Pakistan is a developing country and its economy has seldom seen a stable growth rate. The global recession has brought down the most stable and dynamic economies of the world, especially effecting Europe and US. Pakistan has also seen the effects of this recession through rising poverty, inflation and unemployment. Natural disasters, political instability and rise in militancy have all contributed to the ailing economy. More than 20 percent of the country's population lives below the poverty line, while the GDP is estimated at 174 billion dollars, contributing to even less than one percent of the world's economy.³ Foreign and local investment is at a decline, as many leading investors are fleeing and avoiding Pakistan due to the disturbing law and order situation in the country. Despite all the foreign aid and assistance flowing into the country, the economy shows little sign of improvement. Most of the foreign assistance has been dedicated towards improving the security apparatus in the country.

The state has a huge responsibility now to stabilize the economy, both in the context of micro and macro-economic stability. The benefit of the improvement in the condition of the economy, should reach at grass root level while, also achieving long term objectives. It is imperative for policy makers to also view

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³ https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html.

the economy, through the perspective of counter terrorism. The terrorists want to portray themselves as revolutionaries, by providing quick economic salvation to the impoverished. The policy makers will have to address these tactics, by implementing strategies which provide immediate relief to the common public.

	Economi	c Cost of Co	nflicts in Pal	kistan	
Cost	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08	2008-09
Direct Cost	67.103	78.060	82.499	108.527	114.033
Indirect Cost	192.000	222.720	278.400	375.840	563.760
Total Cost	259.103	300.780	360.899	484.367	677.793

Finance Division, Government of Pakistan. "Estimating Conflict Cost: The Case of North West Frontier Province and Pakistan (Draft for Discussion), Sept 2008. Available at: http://cppr.edu.pk/download/Estimating%20Conflict%20Cost%20-2009-08-20.pdf

Since the independence of Pakistan, there has been a constant threat to civilian and democratic institutions. The constant disruption in the democratic process has prevented the institutions from becoming strong. Since the war over Kashmir in 1947, the institution of the military has had considerable influence on the foreign policy of the country. The frequent establishment of military regimes has strengthened the effect. The foreign policy adopted by

The frequent establishment of military regimes has strengthened the effect. The foreign policy adopted by Pakistan in the 1980s against the Soviet threat and in the 90s under strategic depth, has done considerable damage to the security of the country. Pakistan in the 1980s against the Soviet threat and in the 90s under strategic depth, has done considerable damage to the security of the country. This policy led to the formation of the Jihadi elements and the Taliban, which have proved to be uncontrollable and have become a security threat for Pakistan. After 9/11 it became mostly evident that the allegiances of these elements lie with no one but their own distorted ideology of violence and chaos. According to analysts, the rapid destruction of Pakistani institutions and the failure to transform a religious narrative into a human national narrative can be attributed to some of the key factors as following:⁴

- Ever since Independence strong efforts were made to convert the quasi-secular nature of the Pakistani state as envisioned by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, which was based on parliamentary democracy and federalism; these guiding principles were ignored and the struggle for Independence was portrayed as a fight for the creation of an Islamic state. This was inventive and opportunist.
- 2. On 25th March 1949, Liaquat Ali Khan the Prime Minister moved the Objective Resolution in Pakistan's Constituent Assembly. Munir,⁵ says that had this happened during the life of M.A. Jinnah the founder of Pakistan, "[M]uch of the confusion that appeared subsequently would have been avoided... But Liaquat Ali Khan knew that Quaid-e-Azam would not agree to any such resolution...as it was a complete contradiction of his idea of a modern democratic secular state."
- 3. Starting from the anti-Ahmedi agitation of 1953, the state policies began to be driven more by belief than empiricism. After Gen. Zia, took power in 1977, the nature of the state was drastically transformed by the introduction of Islamization. The armed forces were made to believe that they were an Islamic institution meant to fight a permanent Jihad.
- 4. Another reason for Pakistan leading to Islamization of the state and to support first the Afghan Mujahideen and later the Taliban was the need to drown the demands of Pashtun ethnic nationalism under religious rhetoric.

⁴ Aziz, Khalid. "Insurgency in the North West Frontier Province & Tribal Areas in-Pakistan," Regional Institute for Policy Research and Training, Peshawar, 2007.

⁵ Munir, Muhammad. "From Jinnah to Zia", Vanguard Books, Lahore, 1980.

- 5. Pakistan's crucial assistance in the Jihad led to the driving out of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) from Afghanistan and radicalized powerful organs of state and the religious right. This combination is powerful and dominates the political space.
- 6. Another factor is the growth of autonomous Jihadist organizations for pressurizing India on Kashmir. These extra-legal coercive organizations began to have their own agendas leading them to join Islamist forces including the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, operating in Afghanistan and other parts of the Islamic world.
- 7. The strong militant evangelicalism of Wahabism backed by Saudi Arabia entered Pakistani social space through private charity and the Madrassa, and added fuel to this highly inflammable mixture. It is this deadly potion, which has sown the seeds of an aggressive Islam aimed at dominating South and Central Asian region.
- 8. Pakistan's nuclear capability provided protection to this mixture of revolutionary Islam from external threats.
- 9. The introduction of Local Bodies Reform removed the tier of magistracy and district control mechanism, which was pivotal in maintaining state stability for more than two hundred years. A vacuum was created which has been filled easily by other elements which are fighting the state.
- 10. Another important cause for the crisis of state is the abandonment of merit, efficiency and accountability in the processes of state and government policies. There is also a large resource capture by the elites to the detriment of the majority; amongst the latter more than 30% live on or below the poverty line combined with a 35-40% unemployment rate.
- Lastly, Pakistan's support for the US in Afghanistan after 9/11, invited a strong negative reaction from a sizable percentage of Pakistanis.

Pakistan as a result had to bear the brunt of the war on terror on its land. Until 2001, Pakistan had not experienced a single suicide attack but by the end of 2009, the country had endured over 200 suicide attacks (including 87 in 2009 alone) and close to 500 bomb explosions and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) detonations, largely in the Khyber Pukhtunkhwa Province and FATA regions, closing the year with a deadly attack on a Muharram procession in Karachi. The casualty figure for the last eight years has reached a staggering 25,000 (2009 alone accounting for approx. 3025 which includes militants, police, military personnel and civilians.)⁶

All this has been coupled with human, social and political, economic, psychosocial and environmental costs.

There is a long struggle now ahead of Pakistan. The physical warfare has expanded to attacks on stability and economy of the country with a network of multiple groups supporting this vicious campaign.

Pakistan is in a state of denial about national deterioration and pursuing a policy of deception. There is a need to redefine the country's priorities as a nation-state. We have compromised our statehood in the face of using religion as a political tool. The forceful enactment of radical views in every sphere of our society produced a generation which, is searching for its identity both in religion and nationalism. Islamisation in Pakistan is often blamed on General Zia, his coterie and his abettors like Jamaat-e Islami and motley Islamic outfits. However, the seeds were sown in 1949 when the Objective Resolution was brought forth.

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⁶ Centre for Research and Security Studies, "The Costs of Conflict in Pakistan," Islamabad, March 2010. Pakistan is a country, which has been at the forefront of the war on terror. The whole geo-political situation now revolves around the country, due to its strategic location to Afghanistan and the presence of terrorists sanctuaries on its own soil. The additional problems which, Pakistan faces are from the shortsighted policies implemented by various administrations in the past. The political and administrative backing of mixing religion and state, to appease the religious sentiments of different elements, at various points of time, have created a plethora of uncontrollable extremist elements.

Our country is being plagued by a war, which the Taliban leader Mullah Omer himself calls, "war of attrition". It is a long and difficult road, which lies ahead for our country. Unfortunately, throughout most of this war, the public has been kept in the dark, regarding information and purpose of this conflict. Important steps have been taken, without taking the nation into confidence. This has not only given rise to speculations and misconceptions, but mischievous elements have been able to float conspiracy theories, exploiting the confusion. Taking the nation into confidence and winning their hearts and minds is imperative if Pakistan has to succeed in the war on terror.

Military governments have ruled Pakistan for most of its history. Consequently, the army has the foremost say in the affairs concerning national security and the war on terror. It is about time as a nascent democratic process has been put into work successfully, that the civilian state apparatus should have a say and active participation in this conflict. The problem of extremism and terrorism is on such a grand scale that the army on its own, even with all the resources it has cannot counter the onslaught. It is only possible with the help of the civilian administration that, certain long term measures can be taken to curb the menace of extremism.

While the external dimension is crucial for an effective regional/multi-national counter-terror strategy, correcting internal socio-political dynamics is equally critical for prevention⁷. According to analyst Imtiaz Gul, the following need to be recognized:

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⁷ Imtiaz Gul "Counter-Terror Strategies: The Afghanistan/Pakistan Experience" 09 March, 2010.

- 1. That religiosity is an essential part of Pakistani and Afghan society.
- The importance of development of counter-narratives, accompanied by aggressive governance and justice delivery – to deny militants the use of these weaknesses is essential.
- 3. Work on rehabilitation of militants and denying their supporters the use of these weaknesses for political exploitation is important.
- Recognition of the integral role of the media especially for correcting the way terrorists are projected. Conscious efforts needed to avoid glorifying those endangering public life and property.
- Countering the militant is more an intellectual challenge than a military one. Radio/ TV both extremely important for developing and promoting the counter-narratives that aim at blunting the skewed and self-serving narratives of the militants.
- 6. Security-state notion has resulted in the predominance of the foreign policy by the defense establishment and hence narrowed down the room for civilian input.
- 7. Pakistan's security paradigm needs to change. This will also create space for engagement, rather than intimidation.
- 8. The real challenge lies in addressing the subversion of minds that is taking place daily among the millions of Pakistanis across the country. Radical Islamist ideology seems to cut across all sections of society.

It is also important to note that the researchers are now also increasingly pointing to the link of terrorism with the level of political freedom, not poverty.⁸ In the past, people would attribute causes of terrorism to poverty, but in fact the data indicates that it is areas with intermediate levels political freedom that experience the most terrorism. Both societies with high levels of political freedom or authoritarian regimes have low levels of terrorism. Autocratic nation's

⁸ See for a detailed study by Abadie, Alberto. "Poverty, Political Freedom, and The

Roots of Terrorism", American Economic Review, 2005, v95 (4,Sep), pp. 50-56.

'Tight control and repressive practices keep terrorist activities in check, while nations making the transition to more open, democratic governments may be politically unstable, which makes them more vulnerable.⁹

The following points may help in explaining the details, of the radicalization, that penetrated the region:

- 1. Radicalization of tribal areas and NWFP as a result of Afghan Jihad.¹⁰
- 2. The movement of Pakistan military into the tribal areas, in support of the war on terror, severely reduced the influence of political agents.
- 3. The scaling down of the Jihad in Kashmir, led to the return of Pakistani Jihadists.
- 4. Formation of Mutahaida Majlis-e Amal (MMA) government in former NWFP now Khyber Pakhtunkhua, which was closely linked with the religious elements, and was sympathetic to the Islamists.
- 5. The state failed to implement the law to check preaching by radical Mullahs.
- 6. Illegal FM radio stations were established by the Islamists, which led to radicalization of society.
- 7. There has been a large number increase in religious seminaries.
- 8. The abolition of district magistracy created a vacuum and permitted radicalization.
- 9. The weakening of state was hastened by ignoring merit and weakening of professionalism in the security and administrative services.

It took Pakistan ten years to initiate an organization, which has been structured on the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). While, the establishment for

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⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Khalid Aziz "Insurgency in the North West Frontier Province & Tribal Areas of Pakistan", December 10, 2007.

the Office of Homeland Security was announced only eleven days after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Pakistan, which is at the forefront of the coalition in the war against terror, took a much longer time to comprehend the need of such a department. It has been mainly two years since the first news of the establishment of the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) by the government popped up in the media. In July of 2010, the government immediately put into effect this organization and assigned it with the task of addressing the issue of prevalent terrorism threat in the country. The function of this authority is to coordinate the efforts of various intelligence agencies and law enforcement departments, in order to counter the terrorist threat. The establishment of this authority has come under serious criticism from various quarters, as the level of power and the mandate that it has been granted have still not been made very clear. While many of the law enforcement and intelligence agencies work under the Interior Ministry, there are others that do not fall under it.

This has also raised considerable debate, which has hindered the working of the organization. The authority has been basically established as a research organization, while financial and professional assistance has also been acquired from abroad. For now, it does not have any legal operational authority over the law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The main purpose of this organization is to come up with a viable, comprehensive and coordinated strategy to deal with the law and order situation. It will further serve as an umbrella structure to monitor and coordinate the working of security agencies.

The current counter-terrorism law of Pakistan is a continuity of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, with numerous amendments. The last string of amendments was made in January 10, 2005 during the Musharraf regime. Over the years, the minimum and maximum punishments for the acts of terrorism have been enhanced. The granting of adjournments has been limited to ensure speedy trials and the jurisdictions of anti-terrorism courts have been enhanced. But still, during this time many terrorists have been set free by the courts, due to the various shortfalls in the law. The law enforcement agencies have been resorting to unlawful methods, which has resulted in human rights violations and much criticism has been directed towards these agencies. The recent example can be taken from the murder of Late Salman Taseer, whose killer Mumtaz Qadri has still not been indicted, at the time of writing of this report, due to legal technicalities, even after confessing to the murder. The clerics accused of inciting the killer, have been freed on legal grounds, due to unavailability of considerable proof. There are three Anti-Terrorism Courts in Karachi, which do not have a sitting judge. The city, such as Karachi, which has been plagued with the menace of daily crime and target killings, fails to have a proper functioning legal system. There is much lobbying and advocacy on reforming the anti-terrorism law in Pakistan. In December 2010, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza-Gilani, while addressing the National Assembly, stressed on the need to improve the anti-terror laws.

Considering all this and the efforts extended by the government and its authorities, Individualland Pakistan arranged a roundtable on "Reviewing the Decade Long Counter-terrorism effort: From 2001 – 2010" in the wake of 9/11. Organized at Avari Hotel, Lahore on January 13th 2011, the roundtable reviewed the decade of fighting terrorism. Considering all this and the efforts extended by the government and its authorities, Individualland Pakistan arranged a roundtable on "Reviewing the Decade Long Counter-terrorism effort: From 2001 – 2010" in the wake of 9/11. Organized at Avari Hotel, Lahore on January 13th 2011, the roundtable reviewed the decade of fighting terrorism. The roundtable was an occasion of commemoration and review, where participants discussed the prevalent issues and questions besides contemplating the consequences of implemented policy and measures taken to counter terrorism during the last decade.

This review sketched a picture of what transpired throughout the past decade and provided ample opportunity for soul-searching that may help to understand the present and plan for the future.

Why the roundtable?

Individualland Pakistan(IL) is an Islamabad based non-profit development organization with a national footprint. In an effort to encourage debate on all the important matters concerning the war against terrorism that is presently being fought throughout the Pakistan, IL has previously held various roundtables. The participants of these roundtables are called in from various segments of society to present their expert opinion, regarding the topic, based on the experience and expertise in their given fields. They suggest various measures and course of actions to be adopted, in order to achieve long term stability and peace in the conflict struck areas of Pakistan. The speakers give their views on the threats facing Pakistan, while suggesting a course to address the problems.

- 1. Citizens-Media Dialogue On December 23rd 2009, Islamabad Hotel, Faisalabad
- 2. The way forward towards Peace On May 17th, 2010, Pearl Continental, Peshawar
- 3. Examining Development Assistance On February 20th 2010, Holiday Inn Hotel, Lahore
- 4. Swat: Lessons Learnt a Year Later On August 7th, 2010, Islamabad Hotel, Islamabad
- 5. Citizen as active stakeholders of peace On June 25th, 2010, Avari Towers, Karachi
- 6. Dynamics of Aid and Militant Charities On September 4th, 2010, Avari Hotel, Lahore

Keeping with the traditions of reaching out and attaining expert opinion from various quarters, the roundtable in Lahore examined the paradigm shifts, approaches and policies in the wake of 9/11 attacks. They suggested various preventive measures that can militate against terrorism. The participants attempted to address the following pertinent questions:

- 1. Are there any signs of improvement as evident from the statistics?
- 2. Considering the prevalent conditions, what are the predictions for 2011 as to the security situation?
- 3. What strategies can help achieve our goals?

Speakers presented their analysis on the security situation of the country from 2001 – 2010. They examined the security threat to Pakistan and concluded that the destruction of institutions and the persistent threat to the state is mainly the result of the foreign and security policies of Pakistan.

The roundtable proved to be a sort of policy evaluative process, which highlighted what we can learn and how much we have learnt from the experiences. Given the complicated situation with so many terrorist groups and militant outfits joining hands against the state, the participants called for adopting effective counter-terrorism strategies. Post 9/11, due to absence of leadership Taliban and Al-Qaeda split into smaller groups, but it is to be realized that these groups still are part of the same network. They have the common goal of spreading widespread chaos and weakening our country. There might be some misgivings among them, but it has been highlighted on many occasions that these groups support each other. This has hindered even our policy makers to formulate a comprehensive strategy for the eradication of all these terror groups. A conglomerate of such groups was established under one banner of Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), in December 2007. While, Afghan Taliban's operational area is in Afghanistan, TTPs sole concentration is in Pakistan.

They had travelled to North Waziristan in March, 2010 and were believed to be held hostage by the Pakistani Taliban. Even after repeated requests for their release by senior Taliban officials, Khalid Khawaja was killed a month after abduction, while Col. Imam was executed in January 2011. There have been a rise in grievances and differences among the Afghan Taliban and TTP. The stark divergence of both groups from a common path can be evidently seen in the murder of Khalid Khawaja and Colonel Imam (Sultan Amir Tarar). Both being, senior intelligence personnel in the first Afghan war and Colonel Imam considered a close friend of Mullah Omer. They had travelled to North Waziristan in March, 2010 and were believed to be held hostage by the Pakistani Taliban. Even after re-

peated requests for their release by senior Taliban officials, Khalid Khawaja was killed a month after abduction, while Col. Imam was executed in January 2011. The refusal of Pakistani Taliban to pay heed to their senior Afghan counterparts clearly points to the emerging differences.

The speakers at the review roundtable urged upon media and civil society to play a role for complete rejection of extremism in the society. They analyzed the reasons for the decline of the state in the tribal areas and identified the weaknesses in the government's anti-insurgency policy in confronting the militants.

The speakers identified some of the factors that have brought Pakistan to the brink of destruction as under:

- Since independence there have been persistent attempts to change the quasi-secular nature of the Pakistani state to a religious state for which a narrative has been invented. The Objective Resolution of 1949 was an example of this approach, which was adopted to appease religious sentiments.
- 2. The armed forces were indoctrinated that they are meant to fight jihad in the way of God.
- 3. Supporting first Afghan Mujahideen and then Taliban to maintain strategic depth in the region. Pakistan's role in the Afghanistan war radicalized tribal areas and Khyber Pukhtunkhwa as well as the religious right.
- 4. The creation and subsequent growth of Jihadi outfits for pressurizing India on Kashmir.
- 5. The failure of the government to ensure good governance and social justice.
- 6. Political and economic instability of Pakistan.

Participants

The resource persons invited to the roundtable, are all considered leading authorities in their given fields. Their analysis on the subject of prevalent terrorism and extremism in the country, along with the solutions and opinions presented by each participant, presents an enriching paradigm to address the issue. The speakers selected for this roundtable, all had a unique perspective on the issue and highlighted various aspects in the decade of the war on terror. The resource persons were:

- 1. **Mr. Ahmed Rashid** presents an international perspective to the issue of terrorism. His knowledge of the entire region surpasses any other analyst. He has written various books on extremism and has remained a correspondent for international news organizations.
- 2. **Mr. Imtiaz Gul**, is a leading senior Pakistani journalist and author. He puts forward his views through various studies and media analysis of the region. Imtiaz Gul has also authored books, concerning the situation in the region, which has also won him international acclaim.
- 3. **Mr. Khalid Ahmed** is an author and a senior journalist.He is an expert on the sectarian dimension of the conflict. He is author of various books and is a Woodrow Wilson fellow.
- 4. **Mr. Khalid Aziz** has 30 years' experience in the civil service of the country. He has unique knowledge of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhua. His extensive writings on the region present his deep knowledge of the issues at hand.
- 5. **Mr. Naveed Ahmed Shinwari** has unprecedented access and work knowledge in the areas of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhua. He remains involved in various research studies, carried out in these conflict struck areas.
- 6. Lt. Gen (Retd) Talat Masood is a strong voice, within and for policy circles. He has served in Pakistan army for 39 years and since retirement, he has been associated with think-tanks and universities, both regionally and globally.
- 7. **Mr. Wajahat Masood** is a senior journalist, who has a unique perspective on the unfolding extremism in Central and Southern Punjab. He has written extensively on political and religious subjects.

Recommendations

At the roundtable, the main recommendations which were put forward by the speakers can be elaborated into the following points:

- 1. Policy makers should show flexibility on their hardened ideological stances and delink ideological aims of certain quarters with the state vision.
- We should restore the identity of our nation state. The obscurantist approach should be dropped as all the political leadership is held hostage to religious extremism. Media is a partner and as such it should also play its role to educate the society.
- 3. A genuinely democratic rule should be restored.
- 4. Peace should be promoted and relations with India normalized. There should be no room for religious politics.
- 5. Authoritarianism should be eliminated otherwise national integrity is not possible.
- 6. The religious narrative should be changed to a human narrative.
- 7. Power should be devolved to the grass-roots level; as the elitist approach could not do what empowerment of people can deliver.
- 8. What we have overlooked and which is very basic is the strategic communication. We can take counter-measures by spreading specific messages using FM radios and documentaries etc. Through strategic communication we can convey deliberate messages to the designated audience at an appropriate time to contribute to and achieve the desired long-term effect. It is wise to invest more money on strategic communication rather than making hospitals and schools. Schools and hospitals would be of no use if we lose state.
- 9. Military operations should be followed by development work and formulation of an effective counter-insurgency policy. It is a key prerequisite to change the mindset by heavy investment on infrastructure and the development of every sector

in the tribal areas. Any counter-terrorism measure should be accompanied by a development package, especially for the education and employment sectors.

- 10. The leadership is in dire need of vision. We should be clear as to what kind of Pakistan we want. Pakistan must decide as to whose war it is fighting. If it is the US war then we should disengage ourselves from FATA and if it is Pakistan's war then we must employ a concerted counter-insurgency strategy.
- 11. The department of National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) should be brought under active working condition, on top most priority. It should be given legal authority over intelligence and law enforcement agencies. So it can serve as an umbrella structure to monitor and coordinate the working of these agencies.
- 12. The anti-terrorism laws of Pakistan have to be improved, in order to curtail the trend of terrorists being bailed out on legal grounds and also to keep a check on security agencies to prevent human rights violations.
- 13. Civilians have to play their due role and the civil administration should be backed by the army. The role of media, NGOs and political parties in FATA in this regard is critical.

Situation in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)

Naveed Ahmed Shinwari is founding Chief Executive of Community Appraisal and Motivation Program (CAMP) and has over thirteen years experience in the development sector. Naveed is an experienced researcher and author of the renowned 'Understanding FATA' (three volumes). He remains involved in various research studies and international advocacy networks, and has represented Pakistan at several international conferences on peace and security. Naveed Shinwari at this event, presented research findings regarding the level of support present in FATA for the war on terror, and put forward his views based on the figures presented in these statistics.

According to him, about 80,000 to 100,000 Pakistani troops entered FATA in March 2004 to search for Al-Qaeda operatives. Though the military has carried out as many as 15 operations against Taliban in the area, 60 percent of which is under military, this war against terrorism is still far from being over in his opinion. South Waziristan is in control of the army but Taliban sway over North Waziristan. Attacks on check-posts and suicide bombings persist. In addition to carrying out suicide attacks they are using landmines and target killings besides murdering local Maliks. Once the noose is tightened around Taliban in one tribal agency, they escape to adjacent agencies and thus remain elusive. Mere takeover of the land by the military does not imply exclusion of Taliban. Many groups other than Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan also pose threats to the military.

"Around 25 per cent of tribal people have faced forced migrations to allow the military to conduct its operations in tribal areas. Almost 29,000 houses only in Malakand Agency have been destroyed. The development work is stopped and the reform agenda is suspended. The military, on the other hand, is operating freely; it makes arrests at will and uses heavy artillery. Media persons are unable to observe or report properly. Under the existing circumstances insurgency can grow."

According to Shinwari, over the decades the region lacked governance while, Taliban filled the gap and won popular support by providing a crude semblance of social justice. They installed their own version of Shariah Law and gave verdicts, based on this law. This undermined the authority of the state in the area. They settled 50-year-old disputes. However, there was also widespread support behind the government when it announced military operations against Taliban. Though people do not feel that US drone attacks are justified, support for military operations against militants increased dramatically over the past year, particularly among those displaced by the conflict. The high number of internally-displaced people who left their homes and hearths for the army to conduct operations shows that they want militants to be eliminated from their ranks.

The latest public opinion survey (2010)¹¹ shows that the people of FATA are more optimistic about the direction of the country. In 2009 only 16.7% people of FATA were positive, but now 38% believe that it is going in the right direction. This swing suggests that the ongoing efforts by the government are seen as steps towards improvement. Despite the ongoing militancy and military operation in most parts of FATA, the people of FATA continue to prefer living in FATA. For both years, 2009 and 2010, over half of the FATA respondents confirmed that they would not leave FATA if given the opportunity.

Only 4.4% believe that such drone attacks are 'always justified'. However, when examined by Agency the variation of the 'never' category ranges from 99.3% in North Waziristan to 12.9% in Kurram. The 2010 data also indicates that 58.8% of the respondents believe that US drone attacks are 'never justified'. 24.4% of the respondents opined in a qualified manner that sometimes these attacks are justified if they are properly targeted and excessive civilian casualties are avoided. Only 4.4% believe that such drone attacks are 'always


justified'. However, when examined by Agency the variation of the 'never' category ranges from 99.3% in North Waziristan to 12.9% in Kurram.

According to the survey, nearly 60% of the respondents support to allow the Political Parties Act of 2002 work in tribal areas and welcome President Asif Ali Zardari's announcement of a political reforms package for FATA in 2009. These reforms lift the restriction of political activities in Tribal Areas, while giving National Assembly the power to legislate in FATA.

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¹¹ Shinwari, Naveed. "Understanding FATA: Attitudes Towards Governance, Religion and Society in Pakistan's Federally Administrated Tribal Areas," Community Appraisal & Motivation Program (CAMP), 2010: Peshawer.

Situation in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)



Support for military operations against militants has dramatically increased over the last year. In 2009 only 16.8% respondents approved the Army/security force operations in Swat, but in 2010, 66.8% of the respondents are for the operation. Apparently, the success of the Swat military offensive and the repatriation of over 2 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) to their areas molded the opinion in favor of the military offensive. Approximately 25% of the respondents had been displaced. This condition significantly influenced their opinions on military strategies and the use of drones; they generally support these operations more than the non-displaced do in their respective Agencies.

Moreover, suicide bombing was seen as 'never justified' by 42% in 2009 poll, but in 2010, 57.1% condemned suicide bombing. 41% of the respondents identified 'terrorist attacks' as the main threat to their life. Their description and opinion of the Taliban are important findings. It is notable that the people distinguish between the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban. The reasons for the causes

and sources of the Taliban are very illuminating and they are too complex to summarize here except to say that two-thirds of the respondents, 64.2%, have unfavorable opinions about Pakistan Taliban while only 36.2% believe that Afghan Taliban are terrorists. The idea that the Afghan Taliban are Islamic heroes fighting Western occupation in Afghanistan has dropped from 40.35% in 2009 to 20.2% in 2010 poll.

The radio is the most valued source of information, followed by television and newspapers in view of the tribal people. It is important to note that foreign prepared listening content is as popular as Pakistani programming with BBC running at the same level as Pakistani national radio and the Voice of America via 'Dewa' coming in at third place with a fourth of the listeners.

In 2010 the 'state's inability to provide basic amenities of life' (38.4%), and 'democracy' (30.8%), were the most important human rights issues in Pakistan. In contrast, in 2009 'democracy' (22.8%), 'independence of judiciary' (18.58%) and 'women rights' (18%) were the main issues.

Concerns for deteriorating 'law and order' in Pakistan continues. In both 2010 and 2009 approximately one third of the FATA respondents identified the lack of law and order as the biggest problem facing Pakistan.

The data presented by Mr. Naveed Shinwari indicates that expectations of tribal people are now more directed towards their livelihood and the aspirations for decent living. Whereas these aspirations offer an opportunity for the peacebuilding efforts in FATA it may also result in sheer frustration if not duly taken into account. FATA is the most backward region in Pakistan, with 60 percent of the population living below the poverty line. Per capita public expenditure in the region is one-third of the average for Pakistan. Employment opportunities are limited, and the main sectors of employment are agriculture, transport, (generally illegal) cross-border trade, small businesses, and arms and drug trafficking. Poverty and lack of opportunities are key contributing factor towards militancy in FATA. This situation still persists and needs resolution once and for all. Complacency to address needs of the FATA people would only perpetuate the problem.

Re-emergence of strategic threat

Imtiaz Gul is one of the leading and senior Pakistan journalists. Gul has also

authored a book titled "The Unholy Nexus: Afghan-Pakistan Relations under the Taliban Militia" (July 2002) and currently also heads the Center for Research and Security Studies – Islamabad. His latest book "Pakistan: The Most Dangerous Place" has also won international attention. Imtiaz Gul, at this roundtable, presents a critical view of the prevalent conflict and discusses how the spread of religious extremism, is a threat to the achievements in the war on terror.

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"The situation on war against terror is not very optimistic. The Pakistani military is still under attack. Incessant raids and frequent bombings have left sociopsycho impact on the people. Especially the people living in FATA are very concerned. Technical solutions cannot be preferred to adaptive solutions. Our priority for the military option might prove very destructive. Nevertheless, global actors are not that alert to the dangers ahead."

Imtiaz Gul alludes to his recent meetings on November 9 and December 13 2010, with two CIA officials including CIA director Michael Rowen. Both the CIA officials were complacent about their achievements during the last nine years. They were proud of their technological resources by means of which they have succeeded in "destroying Al-Qaeda to a great extent". They believed that they would have completely eradicated the menace had they got full cooperation.

According to Imtiaz Gul, more visionary leaders like the US Ambassador to Afghanistan, Ronald Neumann could foresee in 2005 that if the US did not address Al-Qaeda's new sanctuary in Pakistan it would "lead to the re-emergence of the same strategic threat to the United States that prompted our intervention in 2001."¹²

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¹² Gul, Imtiaz. "The Most Dangerous Place." The Huffington Post, September 20, 2010.

According to Neumann, the Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan is a direct product of the "four years that the Taliban has had to reorganize and think about their approach in a sanctuary beyond the reach of either one of the governments." The sanctuary in question was Pakistan's semi-autonomous Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), a region bordering Afghanistan where Osama bin Laden and his cohorts settled after their defeat by the US-led coalition.¹³

A logical question is, as to how and why this porous mountainous region of less than 16,000 square miles turned into a sanctuary for Al-Qaeda and its affiliates?

Mahmud Ahmed, Director General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, had cautioned the US about it in September 2001. "We will not flinch from a military victory... but a strike will produce thousands of frustrated young Muslim men. It will be an incubator of anger that will explode two or three years from now," Mahmud told Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin on September 23rd according to a 12-page document, "Islamabad 5337, PTP 7930."

In FATA, Al-Qaeda found local and foreign allies and facilitators to launch attacks on the US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. The Pakistani militant groups banned by General Musharraf entered FATA to join forces and form a new and more lethal Pakistani Taliban, the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan. The Waziristan region in particular became a breeding ground for future terrorists, something Lt. Gen. Mahmud Ahmed, Director General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, had cautioned the US about it in September 2001. "We will not flinch from a military victory... but a strike will produce thousands of frustrated young Muslim men. It will be an incubator of anger that will explode two or three years from now," Mahmud told Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin on

September 23rd according to a 12-page document, "Islamabad 5337, PTP 7930."¹⁴

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¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ As cited by Gul, Imtiaz.

A combination of religious zeal, political ideology, and external drivers are bent upon destabilizing the country's capacity to manage. In that sense, unlike the US, Pakistan has not only to face transnational groups like the Al-Qaeda but home-grown and erstwhile state-sponsored militias and civil and economic upheavals as well. One major standpoint, which is actually a military-dominated position, is that the anti-terror war is a war imposed on Pakistan. If the military establishment is putting up resistance, their apprehensions are not totally misplaced. Anti-West and anti-US sentiments of the lower army cadres are very dangerous. The killing of Governor Salman Taseer has already shown the divisions in Pakistan. Our bureaucracy is not sensitized to the mounting level of such threats.

One major standpoint, which is actually a military-dominated position, is that the anti-terror war is a war imposed on Pakistan. If the military establishment is putting up resistance, their apprehensions are not totally misplaced, Anti-West and anti-US sentiments of the lower army cadres are very dangerous. The killing of Governor Salman Taseer has already shown the divisions in Pakistan. Our bureaucracy is not sensitized to the mounting level of such threats.

Imtiaz Gul further warned that, "Religious elements are dreaming of a universal Islamic Khilafat. The Laskar-e Tayyaba wants to conquer America and Israel. A sort of megalomania has permeated the minds. The Pakistan army has been looking up to Islam as a motivational force. No army, be it American or German or French, needs such motivation. There should be realization that our army is not meant for Islam but for defending the territorial boundaries of the country.

"There is no sign of real improvement. Even religious processions, worship places and holy mausoleums are not safe from terrorist attacks. Though statistics show improvement, there is virtually more deterioration and ideological pollution. The challenge we face is getting more and more serious. There is dire need to reverse the situation."

"The most damaging impact of the anti-terror war is that almost all the militant groups have joined the Al-Qaeda fold. The possibility of even an apparently docile Tableeghi Jamaat as practical part of this network cannot be ruled out.", according to Mr. Imtiaz Gul.

State and ideology in Pakistan

Khaled Ahmed is associated with weekly, The Friday Times, and currently works with South Asian Free Media Association SAFMA in Lahore. He is a Woodrow Wilson Fellow and author of many books including his latest study, Sectarian Violence in Pakistan: Implications for Global Terrorism. During the roundtable, Khaled Ahmed examines the influence of radical elements on the state policy of Pakistan. He scrutinizes the ability of the administration to address this issue and the effects of this mindset on the future of this conflict.

According to Khaled Ahmed, in our counter-terrorism drive, we also have to take into account some basic questions of not only our practical conduct but also the thinking and conceptual mindset that informs our current state approach towards terrorism. We need to ask the following questions :

- (a) Whether Pakistan can frame some policy as a state response to terrorism?
- (b) Whether compared with other countries Pakistan has succeeded in containing the menace?
- (c) Whether there is a difference between the terrorists' ideology and the ideology of the state?

Though there is rebellion in as many as 13 states of India, the situation there is starkly different from ours. No external forces are at work in India to which the rebels could take recourse. Our situation in Pakistan is not comparable with that in India, which has the capability to cope with terrorist threats. Law-enforcement agencies in India show no sympathy to terrorism. In contrast, we also witness radicalization of the society compromising writ of the state in jeopardy.

Our situation in Pakistan is not comparable with that in India, which has the capability to cope with terrorist threats. Law-enforcement agencies in India show no sympathy to terrorism. In contrast, we also witness radicalization of the society compromising writ of the state in jeopardy.

The doctrine of jihad against India is deeply ingrained in our army. If we face defeat, we blame our weak faith for it.

Pakistan began describing itself as an ideological state. Our ideology, like most other ideologies, was utopian. It made us different from India. India was more 'planned' and 'socialist' but was not called ideological because it did not ordain coercion. Today India is de-Nehruising itself. Should we too de-ideologies ourselves?¹⁵ In comparison, we have such laws like the Section 123-A in the Pakistan Penal Code that punishes anyone opposing the 'ideology of Pakistan'.

One can also say that Pakistan is an 'incomplete' and hybrid ideological state. It limits both the conservatives and liberals to reach ultimate ideological positions unlike present-day Iran or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) under the communist party. That's why puritans like the Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahari rejected the Pakistani constitution. One can also say that Pakistan is an 'incomplete' and hybrid ideological state. It limits both the conservatives and liberals to reach ultimate ideological positions unlike present-day Iran or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) under the communist party. That's why puritans like the Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahari rejected the Pakistani constitution. He wants the constitution to clearly ban bank interest, lotteries, insurance and stock exchange, etc, while clearly outlawing women as leaders of the state. His book The Morning and the Lamp is being distributed by the madrassas that agree with him.¹⁶

Pakistan needs huge foreign aid to change this ambivalent mindset. We badly need to amend our foreign policy and behave as a confident regional player not a reactionary force.

We have turned into a rebellious power unlike our neighbors i.e. China and India which are status-quo powers. Indians are not rebellious according to Khaled Ahmed.

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 ¹⁵ Ahmed, Khaled. "Ideology as 'false consciousness'." Daily Times, 21 Nov 2010.
¹⁶ Ibid.

After independence, we did not establish state rule in FATA or instituted police in Balochistan. Accustomed to their free way of life, they are now challenging the writ of the government and creating trouble for Pakistan. This is the price that we are paying for pursuing a policy centered on India for the last 60 years. Now we have a national network of madrassas. Puritans want a "pure state" purged of interest-based economy.

The Pakistan army couldn't fight as in Bangladesh as many as 100,000 of its soldiers were imprisoned. That's why it uses non-state actors like Daud Ibrahim to carry out strikes in Mumbai. It makes no difference whether it is Benazir Bhutto or Nawaz Sharif as both were removed from power after they made efforts to make reconciliation/rapprochement with India. "Who is pulling the policy strings?" questioned Khaled Ahmed. It is our reactionary ideology, hostile policy towards India and inertia in the general approach coupled with lesser economic capability.

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To counter terrorism, we need to learn from Sri Lanka, which showed flexibility to its Tamil dissidents. It opted for free trade with India despite differences over Tamil issue. Sri Lanka being a smaller market as compared to India reaped dividends from such trade and compelled the Tamils to bow before its sovereignty after accommodating them. There is a need that Pakistan also benefits from free trade with India and rectifies South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA).¹⁷

¹⁷ The agreement on the South Asian Free Trade Area was reached at the 12th SAARC summit in Islamabad on 6th January 2004, which created a framework for a free trade area covering 1.6 billion people in India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Bhutan and the Maldives.

Redefining priorities

Analysts like Wajahat Masood, trace the mixing of religion with politics much before that as a consistent process to compromise the state authority.

Wajahat Masood is one of the most vocal media critics of Talibanization in Pakistan and has extensively written on religion and politics. Wajahat has previously been associated with and contributed to the News International, Weekly Humshehri, The Post and the BBC Urdu Service. He was also founding executive director of the Democratic Commission for Human Rights (DCHD), a Lahorebased NGO. In the roundtable, he insisted on restoring identity of the nation state and suggested the course of action to decrease the prevalent religious extremism. Wajahat Masood also discusses in detail, the presence of extremism, throughout the history of Pakistan.

According to him.¹⁸ "the history of conflating Islam with politics goes much deeper than Zia's military interregnum. The founder of Pakistan, Jinnah, though much appreciated for his inaugural address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan wherein he clearly advocated secularism, was not above playing to the gallery when it suited his purpose. More than once, he made public announcements that could clearly be misinterpreted by religious lobby. Whatever hairsplitting we may contrive, the demand for the partition of India was based upon the postulate that "faith can constitute a political community". When his plans for Kashmir were frustrated in October 1947, he made a public speech in Lahore which dripped religious diction and cheap slogans. His successor Liagat Ali was the architect of the Objectives Resolution, passed on March 12th, 1949 in collusion with a rabid mullah named Shabbir Ahmed Usmani. That resolution, now a substantive part of the constitution of Pakistan, is the lynchpin of religious politics in Pakistan. In 1953, Mumtaz Daultana was held responsible for the February Anti Ahmadiyya riots. However, there is evidence that the then Prime Minister Khawaja Nazim ud-Din was equally spineless when it came to defy the mullahs. Once Pakistan joined South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization(CENTO), no government in Pakistan could refrain from playing to the religious pied piper. Ayub Khan was personally -----

¹⁸ Viewpoint Interview with Wajahat Masood: Mullah-military nexus has subverted public opinion. September 30th, 2010 by Ali Arqam. Available at: http://m.criticalppp.com/archives/24707.

a-religious but his dictatorial dispensation and strategic approach necessitated that the mullah lobby be appeased. He restored the religious nomenclature of the state when confronted with a handful of mullahs. He dismissed Dr. Fazal ur-Rehman as head of the Islamic advisory board because Mullahs disapproved of his enlightened approach. In 1965, Ayub invoked religious overtones during his misadventure against India.

Yahya Khan, though much maligned for his lecherous personal practices, enjoyed the approval of Jamaat-e Islami. His information Minister General Sher Ali Khan was the inventor of the fiction named "Ideology of Pakistan". Religious groups supported Pakistan army in the persecution of democratic forces in East Pakistan. Mian Tufail, then head of Jamaat-e Islami, sanctioned Yahya Khan's ill-fated hand-made Constitution in advance and labeled it as Islamic.

Mr. Bhutto, a populist extraordinaire, played religion to the hilt to frustrate democratic forces. "Islam is our Deen" was one of the four points of his political narrative. He convened "Islamic Conference" in Pakistan. He introduced Islamic clauses in the constitution of the country that still rankle the body politic in Pakistan. He declared Ahmadyyia Muslims as non-Muslims through parliament. He enacted prohibition laws. He distorted curricula and media with liberal doses of Islamic lexicon. In fact, he watered Islamization to the point that General Zia only had to reap the fruit. So it is both a simplification and a travesty of history of Pakistan to blame General Zia solely for the religious mess in Pakistani politics that we witness today.

According to Wajahat Masood, in order to get rid of this burden of official patronage of religious extremism, the following major four steps be taken:

- We should restore the identity of our nation state. The obscurantist approach should be dropped as all the political leadership is held hostage to religious extremism. Media is a partner and as such it should also play its role to educate the society.
- 2. A genuinely democratic rule should be restored.
- 3. Peace should be promoted and relations with India normalized. There should be no room for religious politics.
- 4. Authoritarianism should be eliminated otherwise national integrity is not possible.


Adding human narrative

Khalid Aziz heads a Peshawar-based institution Regional Institute for Policy Research and Training. He is a former civil service officer, having more than 30 years' experience with an outstanding service record at the federal and provincial level. He, at this event, presented his views on the menace of extremism, rising from the aftermath of flawed strategies based on religious zeal and its effect on the present efforts carried out against terrorism.

Pakistan came into being in 1947 on the basis of a religious narrative. This religious narrative which paid off at that time should have been changed to a human narrative with emphasis on social security and human rights, etc. However we have not changed that and are facing the consequences. Instead the army's motto has been changed to "Jihad fi-sabilillah" (Holy war in the way of Allah). We prefer Hafiz-e Quran while making recruitments in the army. The army is not clear as to where it is headed. Our approach in politics too is so parochial. In comparison, Osama bin Laden acted as an intelligent strategist. When he felt that the Taliban were in secret parleys with the US as to surrender him to US, he pre-empted the plan by orchestrating and executing 9/11 attacks.

Pakistan was shooting itself besides creating troubles for others. The murder of Salman Taseer suggests that extremist penetration is complete in the security agencies of Pakistan. However it does not mean that we should use reckless military power. Over-militarization of the tribal areas might aggravate the situation.

We have followed flawed policies. Now it is evident that it was wrong to allow Sufi Muhammad's Lashkar to cross the border into Afghanistan to wage jihad against US forces in 2001. This contagion has spread to Uzbekistan and Tajikstan and would reach Chechnya and may affect other regions if not stopped. The proxy wars like Kargil war were undertaken for personal objectives at the expense of the state. Rather than relying on terrorists, the military should have fought wars institutionally. We have reached a situation where negotiations with extremists would not be productive. In this scenario, there is a serious need to devise relevant communication strategies for transformation of the national narrative. Unfortunately, our intellectuals and progressive leaders have failed in communicating with the general public. They do not relate to the ordinary people and thus this gap is being occupied by those, who exploit the population based on religion. On the other hand religious groups are more organized, and deliver services that the state is failing to provide. It is all Greek to the general public what intellectuals say. The educated people come up just short of communicating with the people. Soft investment in communication is not in vogue with us. The murder of Salman Taseer has resulted from the lack of soft investment in transforming the mind of the population. The civil society has a role to play, the role of changing the mind sets. The network of religious groups like Islami Jamiat-e Talaba and Jamaat-e Islami is operating successfully while liberal and progressive parties are behind such networking of Islamists.



Source: Caroline Wadhams & Colin Cookman. "Interactive Map: Leaders of Pakistan's Militant Groups", Center for American Progress: July 22, 2009. Available at: http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/07/insurgency_map.html.

Reliability of statistics

Lt. General TalatMasood served in the Pakistani Army for 39 years, retiring in 1990 as Secretary for Defense Production in the Ministry of Defense. Since retirement, he has been closely associated with think-tanks and universities regionally and globally, working to promote peace and stability in the region. He writes on security and political issues in national newspapers and foreign magazines and is a prominent commentator on national and international television and radio networks. At the roundtable, he was of the opinion that the statistics presented although portraying an encouraging trend, were still not enough to make an impression on the general prevalent situation and more is required to be done to improve the security condition.

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Lt. Gen. Talat Masood (Retd) sees serious deterioration in the security situation. The government, intellectuals and the US or Afghan leaders have no answer for this sorry state of affairs. They have not achieved their objectives in the fight.

Though there are improvements in terms of statistics in 2010, the overall situation was not encouraging. Primarily the war on terror does not depend upon or is determined by statistics. Terrorism has damaged the ideology of the state.

It's a war of ideology that we can only win with public support. This ideology was nurtured to countervail India. It was to neutralize Indian influence that we became an American ally. That's why our policy was of dependence upon America.

On the other hand, the US is achieving its objectives to some extent by containing terrorists. However, Lt. Gen. Masood says, our policies during the last 10 years have failed. Military operations in Swat and Malakand lack follow-up actions. We should not mainly bank on the army. Though the army should stay in the region, the major work to be done is of civilian nature.

But the first problem is that in framing a counter-insurgency policy, there is lack of vision in the first instance. This can be judged by our policies that have massively failed. We should now rule out the possibility that we could get Kashmir through militant outfits. The bitter experience that Pakistan had in the episode of Kargil can be cited as one example.

Being a nuclear power, Pakistan has more responsibility and could not afford jihadists. The world is justified to have genuine concerns against a country having nukes as well as extremists. These concerns are heightened if such a situation is compounded by political and economic instability. The matter assumes still more serious proportions when the security forces targeted a person whom they are supposed to provide security.

The threat of terrorism is just not posed to the tribal areas or Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa but to the entire Pakistan. In the words of Lt. General Talat Masood (Retd): "There are significant signs of erosion of the state's writ in rural areas of the country and if not stemmed now, the menace of terrorism will win and the country would lose this war."

"Real culprits in the whole crisis are lack of education, miserable economic condition, unemployment and increasing poverty. With no employment to offer, the government should not expect to get public support. The people are at a loss as to whether they should support terrorists or the government."

Involvement of civilian authorities

Ahmed Rashid's unique knowledge of this vast and complex region allows him a panoramic vision and nuance that no Western writer can emulate. His book "Taliban" first introduced national and international readers to the brutal regime that hijacked Afghanistan and harbored the terrorist group responsible for the 9/11 attacks. He has been the Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia Correspondent for the Daily Telegraph for more than 20 years and a correspondent for Far Eastern Economic Review. He also writes for the Wall Street Journal, The Nation, Daily Times (Pakistan) and academic journals. He appears regularly on international TV and radio networks such as CNN and BBC World. Ahmed Rashid during the roundtable, stressed on the greater input and accommodation of civilian administration, in the efforts carried out in this conflict.

"Pakistan's Afghan policy has proved counter-productive for the interests of the country. It is high time to say good-bye to the 'double game' that Pakistan has been playing in Afghanistan. We equally need to hand over state affairs to the civilian authorities especially in war-prone areas and where we have defeated the terrorists."

"The world should know about the wholeheartedness of counter-terrorism struggle and a coordinated and concerted political and military strategy in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) has to be followed. "The problem is that the army is the sole in-charge of the policy in FATA whereas there has to be a significant civilian input in the process. At this moment of time, we may also apprehend that Pakistani situation was similar to that of the pre-revolutionary Iran, where a comparable collapse of will and institutions was witnessed.

Ahmad Rashid was also of the opinion that it is also important that the terrorists, who are arrested in the course of war, pass through a fully prosecutionbased procedure in courts. Adhering to such legitimate actions can provide leverage against the popular backlash that comes with use of unmanned aerial vehicles and other covert methods.

Annexure 1: Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan


FATALITIES IN TERRORIST VIOLENCE IN PAKISTAN: 2003-2011 (YEARLY)*


Year	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists/ Insurgents	TOTAL
2003	140	24	25	189
2004	435	184	244	863
2005	430	81	137	648
2006	608	325	538	1471
2007	1522	597	1479	3598
2008	2155	654	3906	6715
2009	2324	991	8389	11704
2010	1796	469	5170	7435
2011	112	25	114	251
TOTAL	9522	3350	20002	32874

*These figures are provisional and compiled from newspapers by the South Asia Terrorism Portal.

'ISE)*	TOTAL 2011*	2106 251	1617	2170	1922	3469	3019	3040	2724	3224	3741	3208	2378	32623	
FATALITIES IN TERRORIST VIOLENCE IN PAKISTAN: 2003-2011 (MONTH-WISE) \star	2010 T	602	500	706	062	1027	714	874	320	548	399	449	506	7435 3	
	2009	564	677	406	518	2024	1754	982	720	850	1374	1060	775	11704	
STAN: 20	2008	654	245	204	121	128	218	403	1247	1215	1057	757	466	6715	
E IN PAKI	2007	71	47	310	277	81	83	478	236	312	537	728	438	3598	
VIOLENCI	2006	165	106	331	193	87	102	113	109	24	132	91	13	1471	
RRORIST	2005	39	17	95	10	70	o	74	25	89	58	25	137	648	
es in tei	2004	4	m	117	12	45	121	53	63	176	153	96	20	863	
FATALITI	2003	7	22	H	H	7	18	63	4	10	31	2	23	189	
	MONTH	Jan	Feb	Mar	April	May	nnL	lul	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	

Annexure 1:





Spatial Distribution—Top 20 Districts (1990-2009)

Source: Hussain, Syed Ejaz, "TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN: INCIDENT PATTERNS, TER-RORISTS' CHARACTERISTICS, AND THE IMPACT OF TERRORIST ARRESTS ON TER-RORISM" (2010). Publicly accessible Penn Dissertations. Paper 136. http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/136



Source: Ibid.



ndividualland (IL) is an active nonpartisan and a not for profit liberal civil society group. It has worked on governance, rule of law, strengthening civil society and democratic development. Individualland has a demonstrated track of working with legislators and civil society organizations engaged in advocacy work. Hence, it has a strong national footprint and has the experience of implementing initiatives aimed at strengthening and institutionalizing interaction between the civil society and parliamentary committees. IL's world view is based on liberal values. It believes firstly in the individual, secondly in individual freedom and then consequently social responsibility but from the reference point of the individuals. Individualland is a space for liberal, secular individuals who believe that the state is for the individual and not vice versa, minimum government is more than enough, private entrepreneurship is the vehicle and root of creativity and progress and market need to be open and globalization to be embraced.

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